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The Entrepreneurial Organization of Heterogeneous Capital 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Transaction cost, property rights, and resource-based approaches to the firm assume 
that assets, both tangible and intangible, are heterogeneous. Arranging these assets to minimize 
contractual hazards, to provide efficient investment incentives, or to exploit competitive advan-
tage is conceived as the prime task of economic organization. None of these approaches, how-
ever, is based on a systematic theory of capital heterogeneity. In this paper we outline the ap-
proach to capital developed by the Austrian school of economics and show how Austrian capital 
theory provides a natural bridge between theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm. 
We refine Austrian capital theory by defining capital heterogeneity in terms of subjectively per-
ceived attributes, the functions, characteristics, and uses of capital assets. Such attributes are not 
given, but have to be created or discovered by means of entrepreneurial action. Conceiving en-
trepreneurship as the organization of heterogeneous capital provides new insights into the emer-
gence, boundaries, and internal organization of the firm, and suggests testable implications about 
how entrepreneurship is manifested. 
  
   2
1. Introduction 
The theory of entrepreneurship comes in many guises. Management scholars and economists 
have made the entrepreneur an innovator, a leader, a creator, a discoverer, an equilibrator, and 
more. In only a few of these theories, however, is entrepreneurship explicitly linked to asset 
ownership (examples include Knight, 1921; Mises, 1949; Casson, 1982; Foss, 1993; Langlois 
and Cosgel, 1993; and Foss and Klein, 2005). Ownership theories of entrepreneurship start with 
the proposition that entrepreneurial judgment is costly to trade, an idea originally suggested by 
Knight (1921). When judgment is complementary to other assets, it makes sense for entrepre-
neurs to own these complementary assets. The entrepreneur’s role, then, is to arrange or organize 
the capital goods he owns. Entrepreneurial judgment is ultimately judgment about the control of 
resources.  
In a world of identical capital goods, entrepreneurial judgment plays a relatively minor role. 
Unfortunately, mainstream neoclassical economics, upon which most economic theories of en-
trepreneurship are based, lacks a systematic theory of capital heterogeneity. Strongly influenced 
by Knight’s (1936) concept of capital as a permanent, homogeneous fund of value, rather than a 
discrete stock of heterogeneous capital goods, neoclassical economists have devoted little atten-
tion to capital theory. For this reason, ownership theories of entrepreneurship, as well as contem-
porary theories of firm boundaries, ownership, and strategy, are not generally founded on a sys-
tematic theory of capital or asset attributes. This paper outlines the capital theory associated with 
the Austrian school of economics and derives implications for entrepreneurship and economic 
organization.  
The Austrian school of economics (Menger, 1871; Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Mises, 1949; 
Lachmann, 1956; Rothbard, 1962; Hayek, 1948, 1968; Kirzner, 1973) is well known in man-
agement studies for its contributions to the theory of entrepreneurship and the complementary 
“market process” account of economic activity (Jacobson 1992; Hill and Deeds, 1996; Chiles 
and Choi, 2000; Langlois, 2001; Chiles, 2003; Roberts and Eisenhardt, 2003). Other characteris-
tically Austrian ideas such as the time structure of capital and the “malinvestment” theory of the   3
business-cycle theory have received much less attention. To several Austrians, the theory of en-
trepreneurship was closely related to the theory of capital. As Lachmann (1956: 13, 16) argued: 
“We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence capital combinations . . . will be ever 
changing, will be dissolved and reformed. In this activity, we find the real function of the entre-
preneur.” It is this “real function” that we elaborate in the following.  
Management scholars will hardly be startled by the claim that entrepreneurs organize hetero-
geneous capital goods. The management literature abounds with notions of heterogeneous “re-
sources,” “competencies,” “capabilities,” “assets,” and the like. Linking such work to entrepre-
neurship would seem to be a rather natural undertaking (see, e.g., Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001). 
However, modern theories of economic organization are not built on a unified theory of capital 
heterogeneity; instead, they simply invoke ad hoc specificities when necessary. The Austrian 
school offers a systematic, comprehensive theory of capital, and Austrian notions of capital het-
erogeneity can inform, synthesize, and improve the treatment of specificities in the theory of the 
firm. Adopting the Austrian view of capital also reveals new sources of transaction costs that 
influence economic organization.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin, building on Foss and Klein (2005), by linking the 
theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm. The link involves first, defining entrepre-
neurship as the exercise of judgment over resource uses under uncertainty, and second, viewing 
the theory of economic organization as a subset of the theory of asset ownership (“Entrepreneur-
ship, Judgment, and Asset Ownership”). We then discuss “assets” in the specific context of capi-
tal theory, showing that the assumption of heterogeneous capital is necessary to the theory of the 
firm (“Capital Theory and the Theory of the Firm”). We next summarize the Austrian theory of 
capital, elaborating and expanding on those parts of the theory most relevant for economic or-
ganization (“An Austrian Approach to Capital Heterogeneity”). The final section weaves these 
elements together to provide new insights into key questions of the emergence, boundaries, and 
internal organization of the firm (“Organizing Heterogeneous Capital”). We conclude with 
some suggestions for testable implications that may be drawn from our theory.   4
2. Entrepreneurship, Judgment, and Asset Ownership 
Entrepreneurs are the founders and developers of business firms. Indeed, the establishment of 
a new business venture is the quintessential manifestation of entrepreneurship. Yet, as Foss and 
Klein (2005) point out, the theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm developed 
largely in isolation. The economic theory of the firm emerged and took shape as the entrepreneur 
was being banished from microeconomic analysis, first in the 1930s when the firm was sub-
sumed into neoclassical price theory (O’Brien, 1984) and again in the 1980s as the theory of the 
firm was restated using game theory and information economics. Modern contributions to the 
theory of the firm (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Hart, 1995) men-
tion entrepreneurship only in passing, if at all.  
Foss and Klein (2005) show how the theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm 
can be linked using the concept of entrepreneurship as judgment.
1 This view traces its origins to 
the first systematic treatment of entrepreneurship in economics, Richard Cantillon’s Essai sur la 
nature de commerce en géneral (1755). It conceives entrepreneurship as judgmental decision-
making under conditions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to business decision-making 
when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual outcomes, is gen-
erally unknown (what Knight terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic risk). More gener-
ally, judgment is required “when no obviously correct model or decision rule is available or when 
relevant data is unreliable or incomplete” (Casson, 1993). 
As such, judgment is distinct from boldness, daring, or imagination (Begley and Boyd, 1987; 
Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; Lumpkin 
and Dess, 1996), innovation (Schumpeter, 1911), alertness (Kirzner, 1973), leadership (Witt, 
1998a, 1998b), and other concepts of entrepreneurship that appear in the economics and man-
agement literatures. Judgment must be exercised in mundane circumstances, as Knight (1921) 
emphasized, for ongoing operations as well as new ventures. Alertness is the ability to react to 
                                                 
1 For related treatments along the same lines, see Casson (1982) and Langlois and Cosgel (1993).   5
existing opportunities while judgment refers to the creation of new opportunities.
2 Those who 
specialize in judgmental decision-making may be dynamic, charismatic leaders, but they need 
not possess these traits. In short, decision making under uncertainty is entrepreneurial, whether it 
involves imagination, creativity, leadership, and related factors or not. 
Knight (1921) introduces judgment to link profit and the firm to uncertainty. Judgment primar-
ily refers to the process of businessmen forming estimates of future events in situations in which the 
relevant probability distributions are themselves unknown. Entrepreneurship represents judgment 
that cannot be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a 
wage (Knight 1921: 311). In other words, there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs 
rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires the person with judgment to start a firm. Of 
course, judgmental decision makers can hire consultants, forecasters, technical experts, and so 
on. However, as we explain below, in doing so they are exercising their own entrepreneurial 
judgment. Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental decision-making is ultimately 
decision-making about the employment of resources. An entrepreneur without capital goods is, in 
Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur.
3  
The notion of entrepreneurship as judgment implies an obvious link with the theory of the 
firm, particularly those theories (transaction cost economics and the property-rights approach) 
that put asset ownership at the forefront of firm organization (Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995) (cf. 
also Langlois and Cosgel, 1993). The firm is defined as the entrepreneur plus the alienable assets 
he owns and therefore ultimately controls. The theory of the firm then becomes a theory of how 
the entrepreneur arranges his heterogeneous capital assets—what combinations of assets will he 
seek to acquire, what (proximate) decisions will he delegate to subordinates, how will he provide 
incentives and use monitoring to see that his assets are used consistently with his judgments, and 
                                                 
2 In Kirzner’s treatment, entrepreneurship is characterized as “a responding agency. I view the entrepreneur not as a 
source of innovative ideas ex nihilo, but as being alert to the opportunities that exist already and are waiting to be 
noticed” (Kirzner, 1973, p. 74). 
3 This contrasts with Schumpeter’s and Kirzner’s conceptions of entrepreneurship, in which entrepreneurship can be 
exercised without the possession of any capital goods. On this contrast see Foss and Klein, 2005.   6
so on. Given this emphasis on entrepreneurship, one might expect the modern theory of the firm 
to be based on a coherent, systematic theory of capital. This is not the case, however.  
3. Capital Theory and the Theory of the Firm 
Shmoo Capital and Its Implications 
Modern (neoclassical) economics focuses on a highly stylized model of the production proc-
ess. The firm is a production function, a “black box” that transforms inputs (land, labor, capital) 
into output (consumer goods). As is widely recognized in modern treatments of the firm, this 
model omits the critical organizational details of production, rarely looking inside the black box 
to see how hierarchies are structured, how incentives are provided, how teams are organized, and 
the like. An equally serious omission, perhaps, is that production is treated as a one-stage proc-
ess, in which factors are instantly converted into final goods, rather than a complex, multi-stage 
process unfolding through time and employing rounds of intermediate goods. “Capital” is treated 
as a homogeneous factor of production, the “K” that appears in the production function along 
with “L” for labor. Following Solow (1957) models of economic growth typically model capital 
as what Paul Samuelson called “shmoo”—an infinitely elastic, fully moldable factor that can be 
substituted costlessly from one production process to another. 
In a world of shmoo capital economic organization is relatively unimportant. All capital as-
sets possess the same attributes, and thus the costs of inspecting, measuring, and monitoring the 
attributes of productive assets is trivial. Exchange markets for capital assets would be virtually 
devoid of transaction costs. A few basic contractual problems ⎯ in particular, principal-agent 
conflicts over the supply of labor services ⎯ may remain, though workers would all use identical 
capital assets, and this would greatly contribute to reducing the costs of measuring their produc-
tivity.  
While transaction costs would not disappear entirely in such a world, asset ownership would 
be relatively unimportant. The possibility of specifying all possible uses of an asset significantly 
reduces the costs of writing complete, contingent contracts between resource owners and entre-  7
preneurs governing the uses of the relevant assets.
4 Contracts would largely substitute for owner-
ship, leaving the boundary of the firm indeterminate (Hart, 1995). 
Capital in Modern Theories of the Firm  
By contrast, all modern theories of the firm assume (often implicitly) that capital assets pos-
sess varying attributes, so that all assets are not equally valuable in all uses. Here we review how 
capital heterogeneity leads to non-trivial contracting problems, the solutions to which may re-
quire the creation of a firm.  
Asset specificity approaches. In transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 
1996) and the “new” property-rights approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990), some assets are conceived as specific to particular users. If complete, contingent contracts 
specifying the most valuable uses of such assets in all possible states of the world cannot be writ-
ten, then owners of productive assets face certain risks. Primarily, if circumstances change unex-
pectedly, the original governing agreement may no longer be effective. The need to adapt to un-
foreseen contingencies constitutes an important cost of contracting. Failure to adapt imposes 
what Williamson (1991) calls “maladaptation costs,” the best known of which is the “holdup” 
problem associated with relationship-specific investments.  
It is obvious that maladaptation costs largely disappear if all assets are equally valuable in all 
uses. Potential holdup would still be a concern for owners of relationship-specific human capital 
and raw materials, but disagreements over the efficient use of capital goods would become ir-
relevant.
5 The scope of entrepreneurial activity would also be severely reduced, since entrepre-
neurs would have no need to arrange particular combinations of capital assets.  
                                                 
4 Contracts might still be incomplete because contracting parties have different, subjective expectations about the 
likelihood of various contingencies affecting the value of the (homogeneous) capital asset. Agents may also differ in 
their ability to learn about possible uses of the capital good. In other words, Knightian uncertainty plus bounded 
rationality could drive contractual incompleteness even in a world without capital heterogeneity. However, the neo-
classical world of shmoo capital is characterized by parametric uncertainty, common priors, and hyperrationality. 
5 Resources that are initially homogenous could become heterogeneous over time, through learning by doing or co-
specialization of human and physical capital. Here we refer to conditions of permanent homogeneity.   8
Resource- and knowledge-based approaches. Resource-based (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1991; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) and knowledge-based (Penrose, 1959; Grant, 1996) ap-
proaches also emphasize capital heterogeneity, but their focus is not generally economic organi-
zation, but rather competitive advantage.
6 The emphasis in these approaches is not economic 
organization, however, but competitive advantage. The latter is seen as emerging from bundles 
of resources (including knowledge). Different resource bundles are associated with different effi-
ciencies, translating into a theory of competitive advantage. Resource- and knowledge-based 
scholars often emphasize that heterogeneous assets do not give rise independently to competitive 
advantages. Rather, it is the interactions among these resources, their relations of specificity and 
co-specialization, that generate such advantages (e.g., Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; 
Black and Boal, 1994). However, this notion is not developed from any comprehensive perspec-
tive on asset specificity and co-specialization (or complementarity) (as in Teece 1982).  
“Old” property rights theory. A sophisticated approach to capital heterogeneity can be 
drawn from the property-rights approach associated with economists such as Coase (1960), Al-
chian (1965), Demsetz (1964, 1967), and, particularly, Barzel (1997). These writers focus not on 
individual assets per se, but on bundles of asset attributes to which property rights may be held 
(Foss and Foss 2001).  
While it is common to view capital heterogeneity in terms of physical heterogeneity—beer 
barrels and blast furnaces are different because of their physical differences—the old property-
rights approach emphasizes that capital goods are heterogeneous because they have different 
levels and kinds of valued attributes (in the terminology of Barzel, 1997).
7 Attributes are charac-
teristics, functions, or possible uses of assets, as perceived by an entrepreneur. For example, a 
copying machine has multiple attributes because it can be used at different times, by different 
                                                 
6 Penrose’s approach, unlike modern resource- and knowledge-based approaches, did emphasize one important 
element of economic organization, namely the rate of growth of the firm. 
7 Foss and Foss (2005) link the property rights approach to the resource-based view, demonstrating how the more 
“micro” approach of the property rights approach provides additional insights into resource value. See also Kim and 
Mahoney (2002, 2005) for similar arguments.   9
people, and for different types of copying work; that it can be purchased in different colors and 
sizes; and so on.
8  Property rights to the machine itself can be partitioned, in the sense that rights 
to its attributes can be defined and traded, depending on transaction costs (Foss and Foss, 2001).  
Clearly, virtually all assets have multiple attributes. Assets are heterogeneous to the extent 
that they have different, and different levels of, valued attributes. Attributes may also vary over 
time, even for a particular asset. In a world of “true” uncertainty, entrepreneurs are unlikely to 
know all relevant attributes of all assets when production decisions are made. Nor can the future 
attributes of an asset, as it is used in production, be forecast with certainty. Future attributes must 
be discovered, over time, as assets are used in production. Or, to formulate the problem slightly 
differently, future attributes are created as entrepreneurs envision new ways of using assets to 
produce goods and services.
9  
Summing up. While capital heterogeneity thus plays an important role in transaction cost, re-
source-based, and property-rights approaches to the firm, none of these approaches rests on a 
unified, systematic theory of capital. Instead, each invokes the needed specificities in an ad hoc 
fashion to rationalize particular trading problems—for transaction cost economics, asset specific-
ity; for capabilities theories, tacit knowledge; and so on. Some writers (Winter, 1988; Demsetz, 
1991; Langlois and Foss, 1999) argue that the economics of organization has shown a tendency 
(albeit an imperfect one) to respect an implict dichotomy between production and exchange. 
Thus, as Langlois and Foss (1999) argue, there is an implicit agreement that the production func-
tion approach with its attendant assumptions (e.g., blueprint knowledge) tells us what we need to 
know about production, so theories of the firm can focus on transacting and how transactional 
hazards can be mitigated by organization. Production issues, including capital theory, never 
                                                 
8 Clearly, this notion of subjectively perceived attributes of capital assets is related to Penrose’s (1959) point that the 
physically capital assets may yield different services, depending on, for example, the nature of the administrative 
framework in which they are embedded.  
9 In this paper we do not distinguish between “discovery” and “creation” as alternative conceptions of the entrepre-
neurial act, though we recognize the general importance of the distinction (Alvarez and Barney, 2005).   10
really take center stage. This is problematic if production itself reveals new problems of transact-
ing that may influence economic organization.  
4. The Attributes Approach to Capital Heterogeneity  
An alternative tradition in economics, the Austrian school, does have a systematic, compre-
hensive theory of capital, though it has not generally been applied to the business firm.
10 Instead, 
most of the substantial literature on Austrian capital theory focuses on the economy’s overall 
capital structure and how money and credit markets affect the allocation of resources across dif-
ferent stages of the production process.
11  
Austrian Capital Theory 
The concept of heterogeneous capital has a long and distinguished place in Austrian econom-
ics.
12 Early Austrian writers argued that capital has a time dimension as well as a value dimen-
sion. Carl Menger (1871), the founder of the Austrian school, characterized goods in terms of 
“orders”: Goods of lowest order are those consumed directly. Tools and machines used to pro-
duce those consumption goods are of a higher order, and the capital goods used to produce the 
tools and machines are of an even higher order. Building on his theory that the value of all goods 
is determined by their ability to satisfy consumer wants (i.e., their marginal utility), Menger 
showed that the value of the higher-order goods is given or “imputed” by the value of the lower-
order goods they produce. Moreover, because certain capital goods are themselves produced by 
other, higher-order capital goods, it follows that capital goods are not identical, at least by the 
time they are employed in the production process. The claim is not that there is no substitution 
among capital goods, but that the degree of substitution is limited; as Lachmann (1956) put it, 
                                                 
10 Of the several dozen papers on Austrian economics and the theory of the firm (including, for instance, the papers 
collected in Foss and Klein, 2002), only a few are based on Austrian capital theory. (See Yu, 1999; Chiles, Meyer, 
and Hench, 2004; Lewin, 2005; and various papers by the present authors.) 
11 Hayek’s 1974 Nobel Prize in economics was awarded for his technical work on the business cycle and not, as is 
commonly believed, for his later work on knowledge and “spontaneous order.” For a modern restatement of Aus-
trian business cycle theory, see Garrison (2000). 
12 For overviews see Strigl (1934), Kirzner (1966), and Lewin (1999).   11
capital goods are characterized by “multiple specificity.” Some substitution is possible, but only 
at a cost.
13  
Kirzner (1966) added an important refinement to the Austrian theory of capital by emphasiz-
ing the role of the entrepreneur (the theme that dominates Kirzner’s later, better known, work). 
Earlier Austrian writers, particularly Böhm-Bawerk, tried to characterize the economy’s capital 
structure in terms of its physical attributes. Böhm-Bawerk attempted to describe the temporal 
“length” of the structure of production by a single number, the “average period of production.” 
Kirzner’s approach avoids these difficulties by defining capital assets in terms of subjective, in-
dividual production plans, plans that are formulated and continually revised by profit-seeking 
entrepreneurs. Capital goods should thus be characterized, not by their physical properties, but 
by their place in the structure of production as conceived by entrepreneurs. The actual place of 
any capital good in the time sequence of production is given by the market for capital goods, in 
which entrepreneurs bid for factors of production in anticipation of future consumer demands. 
This subjectivist, entrepreneurial approach to capital assets is particularly congenial to theories 
of the firm that focus on entrepreneurship and the ownership of assets.
14  
Understanding Capital Heterogeneity 
The Austrian approach to capital generated considerable controversy, both within the school 
itself and between the Austrians and rival schools of economic thought. Given the attention de-
                                                 
13 Hayek’s Prices and Production (1931) emphasized the relationship between the value of capital goods and their 
place in the temporal sequence of production. Because production takes time, factors of production must be commit-
ted in the present for making final goods that will have value only in the future after they are sold. However, capital 
is heterogeneous. As capital goods are used in production, they are transformed from general-purpose materials and 
components to intermediate products specific to particular final goods. Consequently, these assets cannot be easily 
redeployed to alternative uses if demands for final goods change. The central macroeconomic problem in a modern 
capital-using economy is thus one of intertemporal coordination: how can the allocation of resources between capi-
tal and consumer goods be aligned with consumers’ preferences between present and future consumption? In The 
Pure Theory of Capital (1941) Hayek describes how the economy’s structure of production depends on the charac-
teristics of capital goods—durability, complementarity, substitutability, specificity, and so on. 
14 Penrose (1959) also emphasizes the subjectivity of the firm’s perceived opportunity set (Kor and Mahoney, 2000). 
In her approach, entrepreneurs must learn how best to deploy their productive resources; because learning is idio-
syncratic, firms with similar stocks of physical resources may differ in their strategic opportunities. Our emphasis on 
subjectively perceived attributes of capital assets may be seen as an example of a Penrosian perceived opportunity 
set. Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurial “alertness,” by contrast, is not a learned skill, but a talent or ability that is 
not subject to further explanation.   12
voted to the problem of measuring a heterogeneous capital stock, it is surprising that relatively 
little analytical effort has been devoted to the concept of heterogeneity itself. The notion of het-
erogeneous capital is crucial not just for Austrian capital theory, but for (Austrian) economics in 
general. For example, the Austrian position in the socialist calculation debate of the 1930s 
(Mises, 1920; Hayek, 1935) is based on an entrepreneurial concept of the market process, one in 
which the entrepreneur’s primary function is to choose among the various combinations of fac-
tors suitable for producing particular goods (and to decide whether these goods should be pro-
duced at all), based on current prices for the factors and expected future prices of the final goods. 
If capital is shmoo with one price, then entrepreneurship is reduced to choosing between shmoo-
intensive and labor-intensive production methods (or among types of labor), a problem a central 
planner could potentially solve. The failure of socialism, in Mises’s (1920) formulation, follows 
precisely from the complexity of the economy’s capital structure, and the subsequent need for 
entrepreneurial judgment. As Lachmann (1956: 16) points out, real-world entrepreneurship con-
sists primarily of choosing among combinations of capital assets:  
[T]he entrepreneur’s function . . . is to specify and make decisions on the concrete 
form the capital resources shall have. He specifies and modifies the layout of his 
plant. . . . As long as we disregard the heterogeneity of capital, the true function of 
the entrepreneur must also remain hidden.  
Kirzner’s argument that capital goods are heterogeneous not because of their objective character-
istics, but because they play particular roles within the entrepreneur’s overall production plan, 
further developed the link between entrepreneurship and capital heterogeneity.  
In our interpretation, as discussed above, capital goods are distinguished by their attributes, 
in the terminology of Barzel (1997) (Foss and Foss, 2001). As Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 793) 
note, “[e]fficient production with heterogeneous resources is a result not of having better re-
sources but in knowing more accurately the relative productive performances of those re-
sources.” Contra the production function view in basic neoclassical economics, such knowledge 
is not given, but has to be created or discovered. Even in the literature on opportunity creation 
and exploitation, in which entrepreneurial objectives are seen as emerging endogenously from   13
project champions’ creative imaginations, entrepreneurial means (resources) are typically taken 
as given (see, for example, Sarasvathy, 2001).  
Heterogeneous Assets, Property Rights, and Ownership 
Focusing on attributes not only helps conceptualize heterogeneous capital, but also illumi-
nates the vast literature on property rights and ownership. Barzel (1997) stresses that property 
rights are held over attributes; in his work, property rights to known attributes of assets are the 
relevant units of analysis. In contrast, he dismisses the notion of asset ownership as essentially 
legal and extra-economic. Similarly, Demsetz argues that the notion of “full private ownership” 
over assets is “vague,” and “must always remain so,” because “there is an infinity of potential 
rights of actions that can be owned.… It is impossible to describe the complete set of rights that 
are potentially ownable” (Demsetz, 1988:19).  
However, as we noted above, most assets have unspecified, unknown future attributes, and 
an important function of entrepreneurship is to create or discover these attributes. Contrary to 
Demsetz, it is exactly this feature that creates a distinct role for asset ownership, the acquisition 
of legal title to a bundle of existing and future attributes. Specifically, ownership is a low-cost 
means of allocating the rights to attributes of assets that are created or discovered by the entre-
preneur-owner. For instance, those who create or discover new knowledge have an incentive to 
use it directly because it is costly to transfer knowledge to others. In a well-functioning legal sys-
tem, ownership of an asset normally implies that the courts will not interfere when an entrepre-
neur-owner captures the value of newly created or discovered attributes of an asset he owns. 
Consequently, the entrepreneur-owner can usually avoid costly negotiation with those who are 
affected by his creation or discovery. Moreover, asset ownership itself provides a powerful in-
centive to create or discover new attributes, as ownership conveys the legally recognized (and at 
least partly enforced) right to the income of an asset, including the right to income from new 
attributes.   14
Heterogeneous Capital and Experimental Entrepreneurship 
The Austrian idea of heterogeneous capital is thus a natural complement to the theory of en-
trepreneurship.
15 Entrepreneurs who seek to create or discover new attributes of capital assets 
will want ownership titles to the relevant assets, both for speculative reasons and for reasons of 
economizing on transaction costs. These arguments provide room for entrepreneurship that goes 
beyond deploying a superior combination of capital assets with “given” attributes, acquiring the 
relevant assets, and deploying these to producing for a market: Entrepreneurship may also be a 
matter of experimenting with capital assets in an attempt to discover new valued attributes.  
Such experimental activity may take place in the context of trying out new combinations 
through the acquisition of or merger with another firms, or in the form of trying out new combi-
nations of assets already under the control of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s success in 
experimenting with assets in this manner depends not only on his ability to anticipate future 
prices and market conditions, but also on internal and external transaction costs, the entrepre-
neur’s control over the relevant assets, how much of the expected return from experimental ac-
tivity he can hope to appropriate, and so on. Moreover, these latter factors are key determinants 
of economic organization in modern theories of the firm, which suggests that there may be fruit-
ful complementarities between the theory of economic organization and Austrian theories of 
capital heterogeneity and entrepreneurship.  
5. Organizing Heterogeneous Capital 
Here we show how Austrian notions of capital heterogeneity give additional insights into the 
theory of the firm. The key questions are why firms emerge and what explains their boundaries 
(scope) and internal organization. In the following, we relate these issues to our emphasis on 
entrepreneurship as judgment about organizing and using heterogeneous capital assets. 
                                                 
15 We note in passing that the understanding of management may also be furthered by beginning from heterogeneous 
capital assets and the need for coordination they imply.  From a resource-based view, Mahoney (1995) argues that 
an important function of management is the coordination of such assets.    15
The Emergence of the Firm 
Coase (1937) explained the firm as a means for economizing on transaction costs, a theme 
elaborated by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) viewed the firm as 
an (albeit imperfect) solution to the free-rider problem in team production. Resource-based theo-
ries emphasize the need to generate and internalize tacit knowledge. It is not obvious where the 
entrepreneur fits into these approaches, however. Our framework suggests a slightly different 
approach.  
Incomplete markets for judgment. Agents may realize rents from their human capital through 
three means: (1) selling labor services on market conditions, (2) entering into employment contracts, 
or (3) starting a firm. As Barzel (1987) argues, moral hazard implies that options (1) and (2) are 
often inefficient means of realizing rents. In other words, entrepreneurs know themselves to be good 
risks but are unable to communicate this to the market. For this reason, firms may emerge because 
the person whose services are the most difficult to measure (and therefore are most susceptible to 
moral hazard and adverse selection) becomes an entrepreneur, employing and supervising other 
agents, and committing capital of his own to the venture, thus contributing a bond.
  
However, there are other reasons why the market may not be able to evaluate entrepreneurial 
services. For example, Kirzner (1979: 181) argues that “entrepreneurship reveals to the market what 
the market did not realize was available, or indeed, needed at all.” Casson (1982: 14) takes a more 
Schumpeterian position, arguing that “[t]he entrepreneur believes he is right, while everyone else is 
wrong. Thus the essence of entrepreneurship is being different—being different because one has a 
different perception of the situation” (see also Casson, 1997). In this situation, non-contractibility 
arises because “[t]he decisive factors . . . are so largely on the inside of the person making the deci-
sion that the ‘instances’ are not amenable to objective description and external control” (Knight, 
1921: 251). Hence moral hazard is not the only important factor underlying non-contractibility. An 
agent may be unable to communicate his “vision” of a commercial experiment—a specific way of 
combining heterogeneous capital assets to serve future consumer wants—in such a way that other 
agents can assess its economic implications. In such a case, he cannot be an employee, but will in-  16
stead start his own firm. The existence of the firm can thus be explained by a specific category of 
transaction costs, namely, those that close the market for entrepreneurial judgment. 
Note that in a world of uncertainty and change, these factors explain not only the emergence of 
new firms, but also the ongoing operations of existing firms. The entrepreneurial process of combin-
ing and recombining heterogeneous resources plays out continually, through time, as new attributes 
are created or discovered (and as consumer preferences and technological capabilities change). In 
our framework, the entrepreneurial act is not restricted to new venture formation; entrepreneurial 
judgment is necessarily exercised on an ongoing basis. Our approach is thus inconsistent with what 
we perceive as an undue emphasis on new venture creation in the applied entrepreneurship litera-
ture. 
Finally, there is an important sense in which judgment can never be fully delegated. Resource 
owners, by possessing residual rights of control, are the decision makers of last resort, no matter 
how many day-to-day decision rights they delegate to hired managers. Jensen (1989) famously dis-
tinguished “active” from “passive” investors. Active investors are those “who hold large equity or 
debt positions, sit on boards of directors, monitor and sometimes dismiss management, are involved 
with the long-term strategic direction of the companies they invest in, and sometimes manage the 
companies themselves.” While not denying the importance of this distinction, we argue that residual 
control rights make all resource owners “active,“ in the sense that they must exercise judgment over 
the use of their resources. In our approach, investors choose how “Jensen-active” they wish to be, 
which makes them “active” by definition.
16  
                                                 
16 Compare Rothbard (1962: 538): “Hired managers may successfully direct production or choose production proc-
esses. But the ultimate responsibility and control of production rests inevitably with the owner, with the business-
man whose property the product is until it is sold. It is the owners who make the decision concerning how much 
capital to invest and in what particular processes. And particularly, it is the owners who must choose the managers. 
The ultimate decisions concerning the use of their property and the choice of the men to manage it must therefore be 
made by the owners and by no one else.” 
Kirzner (1973: 68) makes a similar point about alertness: it can never be fully delegated. “It is true that ‘alert-
ness” . . . may be hired; but one who hires an employee alert to possibilities of discovering knowledge has himself 
displayed alertness of a still higher order. . . . The entrepreneurial decision to hire is thus the ultimate hiring deci-
sion, responsible ni the last resort for all factors that are directly or indirectly hired for his project.” Kirzner goes on 
to quote Knight (1921: 291): “What we call ‘control’ consists mainly of selecting some one else to do the ‘control-
ling.’”   17
Firms as controlled experiments. The idea of incomplete markets for judgment helps us under-
stand the one-person firm. However, similar ideas may also be useful for understanding the multi-
person firm. For instance, as discussed above, when capital is homogenous it is easy to conceive, 
coordinate, and implement plans for producing, marketing and selling goods and services. The 
decision problem is one of choosing the intensities with which shmoo is applied to various ac-
tivities. In the real world of heterogeneous capital assets, by contrast, production plans are much 
more difficult to conceive, coordinate, and implement. It is not necessarily obvious to which ac-
tivities capital goods are most profitably applied and account has to be taken of complex rela-
tions between capital goods.  
Given that the optimal relationships among assets are generally unknown ex ante, and often 
so complex that resort to analytical methods is not possible (Galloway, 1996), some experimen-
tation is necessary. First, one must isolate the system boundaries, that is, where the relevant rela-
tionships among assets are most likely to be. Second, the experimental process must be like a 
controlled experiment (or a sequence of such experiments) to isolate the system from outside 
disturbances. Third, there must be some sort of guidance for the experiment. This may take many 
forms, ranging from centrally provided instructions to negotiated agreements to shared under-
standings of where to begin experimenting, how to avoid overlapping experiments, how to revise 
the experiment in light of past results, and so on. The central problem is how this experimental 
process is best organized. Does the need for experimentation help explain the existence of the 
firm, or can such experimentation be organized efficiently through markets?  
In a world of complete knowledge and zero transaction costs, all rights to all uses of all assets 
could be specified in contracts. By contrast, in a world of heterogeneous assets with attributes 
that are costly to measure and partly unforeseen, complete contracts cannot be drafted. The re-
sulting set of incomplete contracts may constitute a firm, a process of coordination managed by 
the entrepreneur’s central direction. If relationship-specific assets are involved, the holdup prob-
lem described above becomes a serious concern.    18
Thus, asset specificity may itself be an outcome of an experimental process. To be sure, Wil-
liamson (e.g., 1985, 1996) clearly allows for intertemporal considerations relating to what he 
calls the “fundamental transformation” (i.e., the transformation of large numbers to small num-
bers situation, and therefore the emergence of asset specificity). However, he doesn’t describe 
this process in much detail. In the present approach, as experimental activity provides informa-
tion about how to organize the system, assets will be increasingly specific in time and location. 
Temporal and site specificity will tend to increase as assets become more efficiently coordinated. 
This provides one rationale for organizing the experiments inside firms. Firms may also be justi-
fied by problems associated with the dispersion of knowledge across agents. Production systems 
may exhibit multiple equilibria, and it may not be obvious how to coordinate on a particular 
equilibrium or even which equilibria are preferred.  
In principle, an experimenting team could hire an outside consultant who guides the experi-
mental activity, giving advice on the sequence of actions and asset uses, initiating the experi-
ments, drawing the appropriate conclusions from each experiment, determining how these con-
clusions should influence further experimentation, and so on. However, such an arrangement is 
likely to run into serious bargaining costs. Under market contracting any team member can veto 
the advice provided by the consultant, and submitting to authority may be the least costly way to 
organize the experimental activity. “Authority” here means that the entrepreneur has the right to 
redefine and reallocate decision rights among team members and to sanction team members who 
do not use their decision rights efficiently. By possessing these rights, entrepreneur-managers 
can conduct experiments without continuously having to renegotiate contracts, saving bargaining 
and drafting costs. Such an arrangement then provides a setting for carrying out “controlled” 
experiments in which the entrepreneur-manager changes only some aspects of the relevant tasks 
to trace the effects of specific rearrangements of rights. Establishing these property rights is tan-
tamount to forming a firm.    19
The Boundaries of the Firm 
In the approach developed in this paper, the theory of firm boundaries is closely related to the 
theory of entrepreneurship. Mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and other reorganizations can 
generate efficiencies by replacing poorly performing managers, creating operating synergies, or 
establishing internal capital markets. Like other business practices that do not conform to text-
book models of competition, mergers, acquisitions, and financial restructurings have long been 
viewed with suspicion by some commentators and regulatory authorities. However, the academic 
literature clearly suggests that corporate restructurings do, on average, increase shareholder value 
(Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001). Given such benefits, 
why are many mergers later “reversed” in a divestiture, spin-off, or carve-out? Klein and Klein 
(2001) distinguish between two basic views. The first, which may be termed empire building, 
holds that entrenched managers make acquisitions primarily to increase their own power, pres-
tige or control, producing negligible efficiency gains, and that acquisitions by manager-
controlled firms are likely to be divested ex post. Most important, because the acquiring firm’s 
motives are suspect, such acquisitions are ex ante inefficient; neutral observers can predict, based 
on pre-merger characteristics, that these mergers are unlikely to be viable over time. (Moreover, 
by permitting these acquisitions, capital-market participants are also guilty of systematic error.)  
A second view, which Klein and Klein (2001) term entrepreneurial market process, ac-
knowledges that unprofitable acquisitions may be “mistakes” ex post, but argues that poor long-
term performance does not indicate ex ante inefficiency. In the market-process perspective, a 
divestiture of previously acquired assets may mean simply that profit-seeking entrepreneurs have 
updated their forecasts of future conditions or otherwise learned from experience. They are ad-
justing structure of heterogeneous capital assets specific to their firms. As Mises (1949: 252) 
puts it, “the outcome of action is always uncertain. Action is always speculation.” Consequently, 
“the real entrepreneur is a speculator, a man eager to utilize his opinion about the future structure 
of the market for business operations promising profits. This specific anticipative understanding   20
of the conditions of the uncertain future defies any rules and systematization” (p. 585, emphasis 
added).  
Klein and Klein (2001) discuss empirical evidence that the long-term success or failure of 
corporate acquisitions cannot, in general, be predicted by measures of manager control or princi-
pal-agent problems. However, significantly higher rates of divestiture tend to follow mergers that 
occur in a cluster of mergers in the same industry. As argued by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), and Andrade and Stafford (2004), mergers frequently 
occur in industry clusters, suggesting that mergers are driven in part by industry-specific factors, 
such as regulatory shocks. When an industry is regulated, deregulated, or re-regulated, economic 
calculation becomes more difficult, and entrepreneurial activity is hampered. It should not be 
surprising that poor long-term performance is more likely under those conditions. 
This notion of entrepreneurial decision-making under uncertainty squares with recent theo-
ries of acquisitions as a form of experimentation (Mosakowski, 1997; Boot, Milbourn, and Tha-
kor, 1999; Matsusaka, 2001). In these models, profit-seeking entrepreneurs can learn their own 
capabilities only by trying various combinations of activities, which could include diversifying 
into new industries. Firms may thus make diversifying acquisitions even if they know these ac-
quisitions are likely to be reversed in a divestiture. This process generates information that is 
useful for revising entrepreneurial plans, and thus an acquisition strategy may be successful even 
if individual acquisitions are not.
17 In these cases, the long-term viability of an acquisition may 
be systematically related to publicly observable, pre-merger characteristics associated with ex-
perimentation, but not characteristics associated with managerial discretion. 
                                                 
17 The real options literature also argues that merger strategies can benefit potential acquirers even when acquisitions 
themselves are unsuccessful (Smith and Triantis, 1994; Smit, 2001). Because specific terms and final prices are 
determined only following due-diligence investigation and negotiation, acquisitions constitute relatively flexible 
forms of investment. We do not disagree, but here we are talking about the value not of particular acquisition at-
tempts, but of the acquisition profile over time. Regardless of the option value of a particular merger announcement, 
the information gathered from transactions that are completed, but later reversed, may be valuable to the acquirer.   21
Internal Organization  
As Foss and Klein (2005) point out, most existing approaches to entrepreneurship, even if 
linked to the existence of firms, say little about the key questions of internal organization: How 
should decision rights be assigned? How should employees be motivated and evaluated? How 
should firms be divided into divisions and departments? The notion of judgment-based entrepre-
neurship offers insight into these questions as well. 
Productive and destructive entrepreneurship. Consider first the way firm structure affects the 
exercise of entrepreneurial judgment—or a proxy version of such judgment—within the organi-
zation. In much of the entrepreneurship literature, there is a general, though usually implicit 
claim that all entrepreneurial activity is socially beneficial (Mises, 1949; Kirzner, 1973). How-
ever, as Baumol (1990) and Holcombe (2002) point out, entrepreneurship may be socially harm-
ful if it takes the form of rent-seeking, attempts to influence governments (or management) to 
redistribute income in a way that consumes resources and brings about a social loss. It is there-
fore necessary to introduce a distinction between productive and destructive entrepreneurship.  
When agents expend effort creating or discovering new attributes and taking control over 
these in such a way that joint surplus (net social benefit) is reduced, we shall speak of “destruc-
tive entrepreneurship.” Thus, discovering new forms of moral hazard (Holmström, 1982), creat-
ing hold-ups (Williamson, 1996), and inventing new ways of engaging in rent-seeking activities 
(Baumol, 1990; Holcombe, 2002) are examples of destructive entrepreneurship. “Productive 
entrepreneurship” refers to the creation or discovery of new attributes leading to an increase in 
joint surplus. For example, a franchisee may discover new local tastes that in turn may form the 
basis for new products for the entire chain; an employee may figure out better uses of production 
assets and communicate this to the TQM team of which he is a member; a CEO may formulate a 
new business concept; etc. In the following we use this distinction to sketch an entrepreneurial 
approach to internal organization. Note that we here use the term “entrepreneurship” more 
broadly than before, referring not only to decisions made by resource owners (entrepreneurship   22
in the strict sense), but also to decisions made by employees, acting as proxy decision-makers for 
the resource owners. 
Fundamental tradeoffs in internal organization. The first such problem concerns the control 
of destructive entrepreneurial activities. For example, firms may delimit employees’ use of tele-
phone and internet services by closely specifying their use rights over the relevant assets, in-
structing them to act in a proper manner towards customers and to exercise care when operating 
the firm’s equipment, and the like. However, firms are unlikely to succeed entirely in their at-
tempt to curb such activities. Monitoring employees may be costly; moreover, employees may 
creatively circumvent constraints, for example by inventing ways to hide their behavior. Al-
though firms may know that such destructive entrepreneurship takes place, they may prefer not 
to try to constrain it further. This is because the various constraints that firms impose on employ-
ees (or, more generally, that contracting partners impose on each other) to curb destructive entre-
preneurship may have the unwanted side effect that productive entrepreneurship is stifled (see 
Kirzner, 1985).  
More generally, imposing (too many) constraints on employees may reduce their propensity 
to create or discover new attributes of productive assets. At any rate, many firms increasingly 
appear to operate on the presumption that beneficial effects may be produced by reducing con-
straints on employees in various dimensions. For example, firms such as 3M allocate time to 
research employees that they are basically free to use however they wish in the hope that this 
will produce serendipitous discoveries. Many consulting firms do something similar. More gen-
erally, industrial firms have long known that employees with many decision rights—researchers, 
for example—must be monitored and constrained in different, and typically much looser, ways 
than those employees charged only with routine tasks. More broadly, the increasing emphasis on 
“empowerment” during recent decades reflects a realization that employees derive a benefit from 
controlling aspects of their job situation. Moreover, the total quality movement emphasizes that 
delegating various rights to employees motivates them to find new ways to increase the mean   23
and reduce the variance of quality (Jensen and Wruck, 1994). To the extent that such activities 
increase joint surplus, they represent productive entrepreneurship. 
Stimulating the productive creation and discovery of new attributes by relaxing constraints 
on employees results in principal-agent relationships that are less completely specified. This is 
not simply a matter of delegation, or collocating decision rights and specific knowledge (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1992), but also giving agents opportunities to exercise their own, often far-
reaching, judgments. However, as we have seen, this also permits potentially destructive entre-
preneurship. Managing the tradeoff between productive and destructive entrepreneurship thus 
becomes a critical management task.  
Choosing efficient tradeoffs. In this context, asset ownership is important because it gives en-
trepreneurs the right to define contractual constraints, that is, to choose their own preferred 
tradeoffs. Briefly stated, ownership allows the employer-entrepreneur’s preferred degree of con-
tractual incompleteness—and therefore a certain combination of productive and destructive en-
trepreneurship—to be implemented at low cost. This function of ownership is particularly impor-
tant in a dynamic market process, the kind stressed by Knight (in the later chapters of Knight, 
1921) and the Austrians (Hayek, 1948; Kirzner, 1973; Littlechild, 1986). In such a context, an 
ongoing process of judgmental decision making requires contractual constraints to address the 
changing tradeoffs between productive and destructive entrepreneurship inside the firm. The 
power conferred by ownership allows the employer-entrepreneur to do this at low cost.
18  
6. Concluding Discussion 
This paper emphasizes the importance of capital heterogeneity for theories of entrepreneur-
ship and the firm. If capital were homogeneous, the entrepreneurial act would be trivial. Many, if 
not most, of the interesting problems of economic organization would disappear. This implies 
that the theory of capital should be an integral part of theories of entrepreneurship and economic 
                                                 
18 For a fuller analysis of this point see Foss and Foss (2002).   24
organization. It also suggests extending the Austrian emphasis on entrepreneurship in markets to 
entrepreneurship in firms.
19  
However, the concept of capital heterogeneity does more than simply establish the necessary 
conditions for entrepreneurship and the typical problems of economic organization. Taking fuller 
account of heterogeneous capital, as developed by the Austrian school, reveals exchange prob-
lems (i.e., transaction costs) that are relevant to economic organization but neglected in main-
stream theories of the firm.
20 In a setting with heterogeneous capital and uncertainty, the process 
of entrepreneurial experimentation has distinct implications for economic organization. As we 
have argued, the process of experimenting with heterogeneous capital may be best organized 
within a firm, helping to explain why firms emerge. Similarly, experiments with heterogeneous 
capital assets may underlie much of the observed dynamics of the boundaries of firms. Thus, it is 
not a priori known whether capital assets controlled by potential takeover target will be a good 
fit with the firm’s assets; this has to be tried out in an experimental fashion. Finally, we have 
argued that internal organization is also illuminated by a focus on judgment, heterogeneous capi-
tal, and experimentation.  
To be sure, our analysis so far is preliminary and incomplete. We have concentrated on ex-
ploring the links between Austrian economics and modern approaches to economic organiza-
                                                 
19 The alert reader will notice that while we enthusiastically endorse Kirzner’s contributions to the Austrian theory 
of capital, our own conception of entrepreneurship differs substantially from his. Kirzner, a leading member of the 
modern Austrian school, received his Ph.D. under Mises at New York University and has described his work as the 
working out of various parts of Mises’s system. However, we see Mises in the Cantillon-Knight tradition of viewing 
entrepreneurship as judgment over the deployment of resources, not alertness per se. Kirzner (1973: 39-40) agrees 
that in a world of uncertainty, resource owners exercise entrepreneurial judgment in allocating their resources to 
particular uses. But he goes on (1973: 40-43) to introduce the analytical device of “pure entrepreneurship,” the act of 
discovery or alertness to profit opportunities by those with no resources under their control, and claims that this 
function, rather than uncertainty-bearing, is the “driving force” behind the market economy. We do not find the 
concept of pure entrepreneurship or the “alertness” metaphor useful to understanding the nature of the market sys-
tem. For more on this see Klein (1999: 24-25). 
20 In contrast, our emphasis on understanding economic organization in a dynamic context has obvious parallels to 
Langlois’s (1992) notion of “dynamic transaction costs.”    25
tion.
21 Because we offer here an exploratory, suggestive treatment, we have not described spe-
cific causal mechanisms and have not put any explicit, testable propositions on the table.  
However, our approach is potentially rich in explanatory power. For example, because entre-
preneurial judgment requires resource ownership, the theory of employment—the contractual 
relations between the entrepreneurs and those they hire to help them execute their plans—is ul-
timately a theory of delegation. Judgment, as the ultimate decision-making factor of production 
(in Grossman and Hart’s terminology, the residual rights of control) cannot be delegated, by 
definition. But many other proximate decision rights can, and frequently are, delegated to em-
ployees. Operationalizing this insight, and deriving testable implications from it, can be done by 
identifying the circumstances under which particular decision rights (what we may call derived 
judgment) can be delegated to particular individuals. These circumstances can be described by 
characteristics of the business environment (technology, markets, regulation), employees’ human 
capital (what Schultz [1975] calls “the ability to deal with disequilibria”), and aspects of firm 
strategy. Consider the following applications. 
Decentralization. One approach to delegation is to build on the literature on optimal decen-
tralization, such as Jensen and Meckling’s (1992) important (and, in our judgment, under-
appreciated) application of Hayek’s and Polanyi’s theory of knowledge to internal organization. 
Jensen and Meckling identify some benefits and costs of decentralizing decision rights to lower 
levels of an organization. The primary benefit is more effective use of specific (local, tacit) 
knowledge, while costs include potential agency problems and less effective use of central in-
formation. Decentralization, in Jensen and Meckling’s terminology, achieves the co-location of 
knowledge and decision rights. Employees who are not owners, however, exercise only derived 
judgment, no matter how many decision rights they hold. Optimal decentralization can thus be 
interpreted in terms of the tradeoff between knowledge and judgment. Assigning decision rights 
to employees co-locates specific knowledge and derived judgment, while judgment itself remains 
                                                 
21 See Shook, Priem, and McGee (2003) for ideas on empirical research on the behavioral aspects of entrepreneurial 
judgment.   26
in the hands of owners. The decision to decentralize therefore depends not only on the impor-
tance of specific knowledge, but on the “wedge” between ultimate and derived judgment. Where 
environmental uncertainty is high, this wedge may be sufficiently large that decentralization re-
duces firm value, even controlling for the importance of specific knowledge. 
Occupational choice. Another application relates to the literature on occupational choice. 
Many studies of entrepreneurship treat entrepreneurship as an occupation (i.e., self-
employment), rather than a function, as we treat it here. (See, for example, Hamilton, 1990.) 
What is the correlation between self-employment and judgment? Self-employed individuals who 
finance their ventures with debt or personal savings are surely acting as Knightian entrepreneurs. 
If a new venture is financed with equity, then in our framework it is the financier—the venture 
capitalist or angel investor, for example—who is bearing the relevant uncertainty and therefore 
performing the entrepreneurial function, not the firm founder (except to the extent that the foun-
der’s compensation is a function of the outcome of the venture). We are unaware of existing em-
pirical work relating self-employment to the entrepreneurial function, though such work should 
be important in understanding the role of self-employment in generating economic growth. 
Contract design. Moreover, our approach to the entrepreneurial function has implications for 
contract design.. If we think of judgment as filling in the gaps of incomplete contracts, then the 
more complete the contract, the fewer circumstances in which “ultimate judgment” must be ex-
ercised, and hence the more decision rights that can be delegated. This implies an inverse rela-
tionship between contractual completeness and monitoring costs. While several TCE papers ex-
amine the determinants of completeness (Crocker and Masten, 1991; Crocker and Reynolds, 
1993; Saussier, 2000), they generally focus on asset specificity, not monitoring costs, as the in-
dependent variable. 
Organizational learning. Our approach also has implications for organizational learning. If 
entrepreneurship, and hence economic organization, is the act of arranging heterogeneous capital 
resources, then it is important to understand how individuals and teams learn to do this success-
fully. Mayer and Argyres (2004) show that contracting parties do not necessarily anticipate con-  27
tractual hazards, and design arrangements to mitigate them, as TCE predicts; rather, contracting 
parties must often experience maladaptation to adjust to it. It is thus important to understand not 
only efficient contracting, but the process of learning to contract efficiently. In our framework, 
contracting—an exchange of legal rights and responsibilities governing the exchange of property 
titles—is part of the process of entrepreneurial experimentation. Just as asset attributes must be 
created or discovered over time, the efficient contractual arrangements governing asset uses must 
be created or discovered over time, through experimentation. Conceiving the problem this way 
calls for a theory of learning to organize heterogeneous capital. 
More generally, we hope the analysis here inspires researchers to investigate the Austrian ap-
proach to capital and to explore its applications not only to the theory of entrepreneurship, but 
also to other aspects of economic organization and management. Management scholars are be-
ginning to recognize the value of Austrian economics beyond generalities about the “market 
process” or “alertness.” (Lachmann’s capital theory, for example, features prominently in Lewin 
and Phelan, 2002; Chiles and Zarankin, 2005; Lewin, 2005; and Chiles, Bluedorn, and Gupta, 
2006.) We hope that researchers seeking to incorporate the concept of entrepreneurship into or-
ganization, strategy, and the theory of the firm will consider the Austrian notion of capital het-
erogeneity as a possible link between entrepreneurship and economic organization.   28
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